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1 Introduction
NASA is committed to landing American astronauts, in-
cluding the first woman and the next man, on the Moon by
2024. Through the agency’s Artemis lunar exploration pro-
gram, we will use innovative new technologies and systems
to explore more of the Moon than ever before. In support
of this vision, NASA plans to construct Gateway, a habit-
able spacecraft (Crusan et al. 2018), in the vicinity of the
Moon. Gateway consists of a Habitat, Airlock, Power and
Propulsion Element (PPE), and Logistics module. The PPE
provides orbital maintenance, attitude control, communica-
tions with Earth, space-to-space communications, and ra-
dio frequency relay capability in support of extravehicular
activity (EVA) communications. The Habitat provides hab-
itable volume and short-duration life support functions for
crew in cislunar space, docking ports, attach points for ex-
ternal robotics, external science and technology payloads or
rendezvous sensors, and accommodations for crew exercise,
science/utilization and stowage. The Airlock provides capa-
bility to enable astronaut EVAs as well as the potential to
accommodate docking of additional elements, observation
ports, or a science utilization airlock. A Logistics module
delivers cargo to the Gateway. Figure 1 shows the progres-
sion of missions that will ultimately lead to the return to the
Moon. NASA will collaborate with commercial and inter-
national partners to establish sustainable missions by 2028.
And then we will use what we learn on and around the Moon
to take the next giant leap - sending astronauts to Mars.
For over 60 years, NASA’s crewed missions have been
confined to the Earth-Moon system, where speed-of-light
communications delays between crew and ground are prac-
tically nonexistent. The close proximity of the crew to the
Earth has enabled NASA to operate human space missions
primarily from the Mission Control Center on Earth. This
“ground-centered” mode of operations, with a large, ground-
based support team, has had several advantages: the on-
board crew could be smaller, the vehicles could be simpler
and lighter, and the mission performed for a lower cost. De-
spite these advantages, NASA has invested in numerous Ar-
tificial Intelligence (AI) techniques to make Human Space-
flight Mission Control more efficient and effective (Smith et
al. 2014), as well as to automate some functions onboard the
International Space Station (Cornelius and Frank 2016).
Gateway, however, will feature four crew instead of 6 (or
more), and will be occupied for only a few months out of
the year. Small crews cannot take on all Gateway functions
performed by ground today, and so vehicles must be more
automated to reduce the crew workload for such missions.
In addition, both near-term and future missions will feature
significant periods when crew is not present; Gateway shall
provide for autonomous operations for up to 21 days, in-
dependent of ground communications, when crew are not
present. A thorough assessment of human spaceflight dor-
mancy and autonomy requirements for a future Mars mis-
sion (Williams-Byrd et al. 2016) describes the wide range of
challenges to be faced. The need for autonomy is reflected in
the Gateway concept of operations (Crusan et al. 2018) and
its requirements, as well as requirements for the first of its
components, the PPE (NASA 2018). Gateway may benefit
from robotic assistants inside the spacecraft, and robots may
perform some functions while astronauts are not present. Fi-
nally, future missions to Mars will require crew and ground
to operate independently from Earth-based Mission Con-
trol. Due to the mission-critical nature of human spaceflight,
autonomy technology must be robust and resilient, both to
changes in environment, faults and failures, and also the
somewhat unpredictable nature of human-machine collab-
oration. Maturing autonomy technologies for use on Gate-
way, and other Artemis elements, will require early adoption
to choose the best solutions and determine best engineering
practices, and stress the interaction between multiple tech-
nologies as well as human-machine interaction.
Artificial Intelligence (AI) is a growing field of computa-
tional science techniques designed to mimic functions per-
formed by people. Advancements in autonomy will depend
on a portfolio of AI technologies. Automated planning and
scheduling is a venerable field of study in AI, and is needed
for a variety of mission planning functions. Plan execution
technology is less well studied, but important for auton-
omy and robotics. Specialized forms of automated reason-
ing and machine learning are key technologies to enable
fault management. Over the past decade, the NASA Au-
tonomous Systems and Operations (ASO) project has devel-
oped and demonstrated numerous autonomy enabling tech-
nologies employing AI techniques. Our work has employed
AI in three distinct ways to enable autonomous mission op-
erations capabilities. Crew Autonomy gives astronauts tools
to assist in the performance of each of these mission oper-
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Figure 1: The first phase of Artemis will lead to NASA returning humans to the Moon by 2024.
ations functions. Vehicle System Management uses AI tech-
niques to turn the astronaut’s spacecraft into a robot, allow-
ing it to operate when astronauts are not present, or to reduce
astronaut workload. AI technology also enables Autonomous
Robots as crew assistants or proxies when the crew are not
present. When these capabilities are used to enable astro-
nauts to operate autonomously, they must be integrated with
user interfaces, introducing numerous human factors con-
siderations; when these capabilities are used to enable vehi-
cle system management, they must be integrated with flight
software, and run on embedded processors under the control
of real-time operating systems.
We first describe human spaceflight mission operations
capabilities. The remainder of the paper will describe the
ASO project, and the development and demonstration per-
formed by ASO since 2011. We will describe the AI tech-
niques behind each of these demonstrations, which include a
variety of symbolic automated reasoning and machine learn-
ing based approaches. Finally, we conclude with an assess-
ment of future development needs for AI to enable NASA’s
future Exploration missions.
2 Human Spaceflight Mission Operations
NASA’s human spaceflight mission operations functions are
performed by flight controllers, both before and during mis-
sions. For the purposes of this work, we focus on functions
performed during the mission, and break these functions into
Monitoring, Planning, Execution and Fault Management.
Monitoring addresses the following question: What is the
state of the spacecraft? Monitoring requires processing and
abstracting data from sensors. Flight controllers group the
resulting information into displays, both physical and logi-
cal, that contain information specific to major spacecraft sys-
tem and phases of mission. For instance, power systems data
is monitored by one operator, while attitude and orientation
information is monitored by a different operator. Monitoring
ensures plans are being executed as expected, and the space-
craft state and the state of all relevant systems is known.
Planning addresses the question: What is the spacecraft
doing, and when? Plans are created to achieve specific ob-
jectives. For most spacecraft, plans are created days to weeks
(or even months) ahead of time. Plans are often created for
major spacecraft subsystems separately, then integrated. For
example, a plan to orient the solar arrays of the International
Space Station (ISS) is created independently, by one team of
operators, from the plan for crew activities, which is created
by a second team. These plans must be integrated, and dis-
crepancies resolved, prior to execution. Unexpected events
or faults may require replanning on shorter time scales,
which is discussed in subsequent paragraphs.
Plans are no good unless they are executed. Execution ad-
dresses the question: What is the next activity to perform?
When it is performed, what was the outcome? Execution ul-
timately involves issuing commands to spacecraft subsys-
tems and ensuring results are as expected. Execution for hu-
man spacecraft such as the International Space Station also
requires ensuring astronauts have performed their activities
as planned. Execution ultimately is driven by planning, and
results in the need to monitor spacecraft systems to ensure
the results are as expected. If unexpected events occur, re-
planning may be needed.
Fault management addresses the question: Is something
wrong? If so, what has gone wrong, and what are the im-
pacts? Fault management involves the detection and isola-
tion of faults. Monitoring may provide the first indication
of faults or anomalies; anomalies may be the precursors of
faults. Faults often come not as single spies, but in battal-
ions; in such cases, it is important to determine the root
cause of many faults. Fault management also involves de-
termining the consequences of faults. Recovering from or
mitigating faults also involves replanning.
3 Autonomous Systems and Operations
NASA’s Autonomous Systems and Operations (ASO)
project1 has extensively demonstrated the use of AI tech-
niques to help monitor, plan, execute, and manage faults for
future human space missions. The ASO project has success-
fully demonstrated autonomy capabilities in all three previ-
ously described main areas: Crew Autonomy, Vehicle Sys-
tems Management, and Autonomous Robotics. We describe
1Previously called the Autonomous Mission Operations
project.
ASO’s activity in each of these areas below, emphasizing the
specific AI techniques in each demonstration. A quantitative
summary of AI techniques used for each demonstration also
appears in the summary (see Figure 6).
3.1 Crew Autonomy
In (Frank et al. 2013), ASO demonstrated the impact of
planning and fault management on mission operations in
the presence of time delay. Mission operation scenarios were
designed for NASA’s Deep Space Habitat (DSH), an analog
spacecraft habitat, covering a range of activities including
nominal objectives, system failures, and crew medical emer-
gencies. The scenarios were simulated at time delay val-
ues representative of Lunar (1.2-5 sec), Near Earth Object
(NEO) (50 sec) and Mars (300 sec) missions. Each combi-
nation of operational scenario and time delay was tested in a
Baseline configuration, designed to reflect present-day oper-
ations of the ISS, and a Mitigation configuration in which
AI-based planning and fault management tools, informa-
tion displays, and crew-ground communications protocols
were employed to assist both crews and Flight Control Team
(FCT) members with mitigating the long-delay conditions.
Cognitive workload of both crewmembers and FCT mem-
bers generally increased along with increasing time delay.
Autonomy enabling technology decreased the workload of
both flight controllers and crew, and decreased the difficulty
of coordinating activities.
The AMO TOCA SSC demonstration (Frank et al. 2015)
demonstrated planning and fault management of two space-
craft systems onboard the International Space Station (ISS).
Astronauts managed the Total Organic Carbon Analyzer
(TOCA), a water quality analyzer, and Station Support Com-
puters (SSC) laptops, which are non-critical crew computer
systems. These systems were selected as representative of
systems a future crew may need to operate autonomously
during a deep space mission. ISS astronauts autonomously
operated these systems (see Figure 2), taking on mission op-
erations functions traditionally performed by support teams
on the ground, using new software tools that provide deci-
sion support algorithms for planning, monitoring and fault
management, hardware schematics, system briefs, and data
displays that are normally unavailable to the crew. Manag-
ing TOCA required monitoring 22 data items for detect-
ing anomalies, generating plans of up to 6 activities (of 12
possible) subject to 10 constraints, and detecting 70 faults.
Monitoring SSCs required monitoring 161 data items for
faults. The experiment lasted seven months, during which
ISS crews managed TOCA and SSCs on 22 occasions. The
AMO software processed data from TOCA and SSCs con-
tinuously during this seven month period. The combined
performance of the software and crew achieved a 88% suc-
cess rate on managing TOCA activity, the system for which
ground-truth was available.
The AMO EXPRESS and AMO EXPRESS 2.0 plan
execution demonstrations automated activation and de-
activation of a facility experiment rack with a single op-
erator action, described in (Stetson et al. 2015). The auto-
procedures perform combined “core” (e.g. power, thermal,
life support) and payload commanding with embedded fault
Figure 2: User interface for AMO TOCA SSC demonstra-
tion, showing a TOCA error detected by fault management
displayed for ISS crew.
detection and recovery, essentially performing the specific
operations responsibilities for three flight controllers. In ad-
dition, the auto-procedures were integrated with a Web-
based procedure execution monitoring system. The proce-
dure executes 59 individual commands, and monitored 236
distinct data items. A first demonstration showed that the
facility could be powered up and configured automatically
from the ground; a second demonstration showed that the
the task could be performed and monitored by ISS astro-
nauts. In both demonstrations, ISS flight controllers sched-
uled the activity, which astronauts performed at the desig-
nated time; this demonstration is being extended to require
planning, i.e. astronauts will also decide when to schedule
the activity based on a variety of constraints.
Figure 3: Simulated Control Center used to evaluate
ACAWS. Both Flight Controllers and crew have access to
ACAWS output.
ASO developed and tested an automated model-based
fault management called Advanced Caution and Warning
(ACAWS). ACAWS was tested on Orion Exploration Flight
Test 1 (EFT-1) data from prelaunch to post- landing, as de-
scribed in (Aaseng et al. 2015). The system was tested ex-
tensively using nominal test data from the Orion Program
and combined with fault signature data developed by the
ACAWS test team and supported by NASA Flight Opera-
tions Directorate. Nominal data was recorded when Orion
test data was transmitted to the Mission Control Center, ei-
ther from the Orion EFT-1 spacecraft during vehicle check-
out, or from Orion test and simulation systems. The ACAWS
system was configured to detect and display approximately
3500 failure modes, ranging from sensor faults to major
system component failures, monitoring approximately 2500
unique telemetry elements. The system executed on a Linux
laptop at a 1 Hz execution rate. Flight controller evaluation
indicated that the information provided by ACAWS would
be an effective aid in rapidly understanding failures and re-
sponding more quickly and accurately with adequate train-
ing and familiarity.
3.2 Vehicle System Management
ASO integrated planning, plan execution and fault manage-
ment technologies into a Vehicle System Manager (VSM)
able to autonomously operate a dormant (uncrewed) space
habitat, described in (Aaseng et al. 2018). These technolo-
gies included a fault-tolerant avionics architecture, novel
spacecraft power system and power system controller, and
autonomy software to control the habitat. The power system
controller was developed by a partner project (May et al.
2014), (Csank et al. 2018). The demonstration involved sim-
ulation of the habitat and multiple spacecraft sub-systems
(power storage and distribution, avionics, and air-side life-
support). The foundation of the demonstration was ‘quies-
cent operations’ of a habitat during a 55 minute eclipse pe-
riod. For this demonstration, the spacecraft power distribu-
tion system and air-side life support system were simulated
at a high level of fidelity; additional systems were man-
aged, but with lower fidelity operational constraints and sys-
tem behavior. Operational constraints for real and simulated
loads were derived from ISS hardware and future Explo-
ration capable technology. A total of 13 real and simulated
loads were used during the test. The VSM monitored 208
parameters, was able to detect and respond to 159 faults,
and managed plans of 312 steps in the presence of 13 load
constraints, 6 power system configuration constraints, and 6
operational constraints (e.g. two systems must be on or off
simultaneously, a system cannot remain off for more than 30
minutes, etc). Evaluation was performed with eight scenar-
ios including both nominal and off- nominal conditions. We
have subsequently scaled the number of loads (to 24), activ-
ities, operational constraints (roughly 50) and fault modes.
ASO has subsequently adapted the ACAWS fault man-
agement technology as an autonomous VSM function; while
Orion may be in Earth proximity, fault management will
improve the crew’s situational awareness, and may be im-
portant in the event of loss of communications. In (Aaseng,
Sweet, and Ossenfort. 2018), (Aaseng and Frank. 2016) we
describe the deployment of ACAWS on an embedded flight
computer and a real-time operating system. The consider-
ably larger size of the ACAWS fault model, and the larger
number of parameters to monitor, make this a more useful
stressing case than the Habitat-based VSM described above
(5000 faults for the current Orion model versus 159 faults
for the Habitat model.)
3.3 Robotics
ASO demonstrated planning and plan execution of a dex-
terous manipulator performing an ISS-inspired biological
science scenario (Azimi, Zemler, and Morris 2019). The
demonstration system was implemented using the Robot
Operating System (ROS) for inter-process communication
between planning, perception and control, ROSPlan to im-
plement task-level planning and execution, and affordance
templates to perform kinematics and continuous path plan-
ning. The test setup utilizes the Sawyer robot with electric
parallel gripper manufactured by Rethink Robotics, and a
mockup ISS experiment facility with objectives such as ma-
nipulating test tubes for a science experiment. The combined
system was used to plan activities such as the inspection of
test tubes, simulated activities such as heating and shaking,
sending data to ground to await confirmation to proceed, etc.
Execution of the plans can be disrupted by long wait times,
switching test tube positions, and other unexpected events.
Plans range in size from 50-70 actions; there are 28 distinct
action types, so many actions are repeated in these plans. A
total of 54 predicates describing the robot and experiment
rack state are monitored during execution
4 Artificial Intelligence Enabling
Autonomous Mission Operations
We describe the specific AI applications employed by each
ASO demonstration in more detail below.
4.1 Planning and Scheduling
The planner used in (Frank et al. 2015) is custom code de-
signed specifically to generate new TOCA activities based
on TOCA operating constraints and the current schedule. We
chose this design due to the simplicity of generating a small
set of TOCA activities 2-3 weeks into the future, allowing
us to focus on deployment and system integration with other
AI components needed to manage TOCA.
The VSM planner uses the Solving Constrained Integer
Programs (SCIP) Optimization tool (Achterberg. 2009), an
open-source tool designed to solve constrained optimiza-
tion problems which combine mixed-integer, and linear pro-
gramming, and constraint programming methods. We mod-
eled the power loads as jobs to be scheduled. Each job had
periodic constraints to model duty cycles for each load, con-
straints requiring some loads power mode to be synchro-
nized with each other, and constraints on the maximum in-
stantaneous power demand and total energy consumption
over the 2-hour plan horizon (see Figure 4). As the mission
continued, or when new circumstances (e.g. advancing time,
new goals or constraints, unexpected events, or faults) arise,
the scheduler generates new plans. The SCIP solver is re-
invoked every 5 minutes as new information becomes avail-
able, or when faults occur.
The planner used in our robotics work is POPF (Coles et
al. 2010), a model-based planner that employs a declarative
action model. Planning problems are formulated by defining
a Plan Domain Description Language (PDDL) 2.1 domain.
For more information about this form of planning, we re-
fer the reader to (Ghallab, Nau, and Traverso 2004). Plan
Figure 4: VSM planning and replanning in the presence of
power systems faults.
actions are mapped to affordance templates, which provide
a way of describing an action that an object affords to the
robot, such as picking up a test tube. The construct of an
affordance template allows multiple methods to achieve dif-
ferent goals for the same objects, e.g. pick an object versus
place an object.
4.2 Execution
The AMO EXPRESS demonstrations onboard ISS em-
ployed Timeliner as an executive. Timeliner (Brown et al.
2002) provides a way to programmatically model human
decisions. Its constructs relate directly to the decision pro-
cesses made by ISS flight controllers each day concern-
ing such things as activating and monitoring facilities and
payloads and any other procedural processes. Timeliner has
English language constructs that allow someone with little
programmer experience to not only follow and understand
execution, but to write scripts. Timeliner scripts are hierar-
chically organized. The top level construct, the bundle, is a
place holder for sequences. Within each bundle there has to
be at least one sequence, which is the executable code that
can start executing autonomously or by ground command-
ing. In addition to the natural language control constructs
and the hierarchical nature of bundles and sequences, Time-
liner is well integrated with the ISS command and teleme-
try system, making integration with ISS flight software quite
straightforward.
The VSM demonstration employed The Plan Execu-
tion and Interchange Language (PLEXIL) as an executive.
PLEXIL was developed as a collaborative effort by NASA
and Carnegie Mellon University, and subsequently released
as open-source software (Verma et al. 2006). PLEXIL is
a language for representing flexible robust plans intended
to be executed in an uncertain and changing environment.
PLEXIL provides numerous conditions to control the ex-
ecution of plan elements, including loops and hierarchi-
cal decomposition, and provides internal plan element state
tracking that can be used natively as part of control logic.
PLEXIL provides well defined execution semantics with
contingency handling which can be formally validated and
produces deterministic results given the same sequence of
environmental inputs. PLEXIL’s Execution Engine (execu-
tive) executes stored plans written in the PLEXIL language;
it can load new plans during execution.
The Robotics work employs ROSPlan as an executive.
ROSPlan contains a Knowledge Base that manages the
evolving state of the world and interprets a model for plan-
ning. The deliberative layers consist of a ROSPlan manager
(RPM), that commands and monitors the Knowledge Base,
and the planning system for generating and executing task
plans. The plan dispatcher commands and receives feedback
from the robot behavior components, which are themselves
composed of sequences of simple actions, and updates the
Knowledge Base. ROSPlan components were designed with
a one to one relationship to the actions in the PDDL domain
model. When ROSPlan dispatched an action to the desired
component, the component would invoke the behavior re-
quired for completing the action. Upon successful comple-
tion of the behavior, we would update the ROSPlan Knowl-
edge Base with the effects of the action, using sensor data as
verification prior to updating as applicable.
4.3 Fault Management
Both our VSM work and our Orion fault management work
employ the Testability Engineering and Maintenance Sys-
tem (Real Time) (TEAMS-RT) (Mathur, Deb, and Pattipati
1998) software as a foundation. TEAMS models consist of
components, fault modes for each component, a compo-
nent interconnection model representing transfer of capabil-
ity (e.g. flow of current or data), and a set of (logical) tests.
Each test is associated with a set of fault modes it is able
to identify, which is a function of the inter-connectivity of
components. Tests can pass, fail or be unknown. TEAMS-
RT correlates test points with failure modes. A failed test
can implicate one or more failure modes, while a passing
test exonerates failures. With sufficient data, a single fail-
ure mode can be identified that is responsible for all failed
tests, and an unambiguous failure mode is identified. Other-
wise, TEAMS determines the smallest set of possible failure
modes that could be responsible for failed tests and presents
an ambiguity group of possible failures. TEAMS on its own
performs fault isolation, but requires upstream processing to
transform sensor data from systems into test pass-fail inputs.
While TEAMS is commercial software, we created the up-
stream code for VSM and Orion fault detection.
The Fault Impacts Reasoner (FIR) determines the resul-
tant impacts of confirmed failures (Aaseng et al. 2015). Im-
pacts include the loss of function due to a fault, such as the
components that have lost electrical power due to a fault in
the electrical system. The loss of redundancy due to a fault
is also determined. Most critical functions in spacecraft de-
pend on redundancy to assure the availability of the function
in spite of failures. Of particular concern is any function that
could be lost by a single additional failure, or has become
zero-fault tolerant. Fault impacts are determined by trac-
ing the inter-connectivity graph from the faulty component,
identifying loss of capability along component interconnec-
tions. When there are multiple paths between components,
loss of redundancy is also computed. While FIR’s reasoning
algorithm was implemented by NASA, it uses the TEAMS
model as a foundation.
The TOCA crew autonomy demonstration and the VSM
demonstration used the Hybrid Diagnosis Engine (HyDE)
(Narasimham and Brownstone 2007) for fault detection and
isolation. HyDE uses hybrid (combined discrete and con-
tinuous) models and sensor data from the system being di-
agnosed to deduce the evolution of the state of the system
over time, including changes in state indicative of faults.
HyDE models are state transition diagrams, showing how
events change system state; these events can be nominal (e.g.
commands and processes) or faults. When the sensor data
are no longer consistent with the nominal mode transitions,
HyDE determines what failure mode or modes are now con-
sistent with the data. While HyDE requires some prepro-
cessing of system sensor data, HyDE can take general in-
puts (commands, numerical values) from systems, making it
more powerful than TEAMS-RT, but more computationally
expensive. In contrast with TEAMS, HyDE can represent
hybrid systems, i.e. mixes of discrete and continuous quanti-
ties; TEAMS, by contrast, can only model discrete systems.
Anomaly detection was performed for TOCA and for bat-
teries during an early VSM demonstration. Anomaly de-
tection is performed using two linked algorithms. The In-
ductive Monitoring System (IMS) (Iverson 2004) is used to
learn a model of the nominal performance of a system using
recorded data gathered from prior runs via clustering. Once
the clusters are created, new instances of system device be-
havior can be compared to the previously learned behavior,
and the distances δ(b, c) are computed. In previous incarna-
tions of IMS, if the new vector b is ‘too far away’ from all
clusters, an anomaly is declared. The Meta-Monitoring Sys-
tem (MMS) generalizes this idea by computing the probabil-
ity distribution of the cluster distances of the training data; if
the new vectors’ distance from all clusters is ‘too unlikely’
according to this probability distribution, an anomaly is de-
clared (Frank et al. 2015).
5 Autonomy Technology Interaction
Paradigms
ASO’s Crew Autonomy demonstrations onboard ISS re-
quired considerable systems integration. Fortunately, most
of the applications were run on laptop computers and mo-
bile devices (see Figure 5) used by ISS crew, and served
by Linux and Windows servers. Containerization and per-
formance considerations were still important, and the oper-
ating systems, packages, and supporting software were lim-
ited, complicating integration efforts. AMO EXPRESS also
required a non-trivial interface to the Timeliner software,
which runs in an embedded computer onboard ISS. These
integration efforts did not specifically complicate the use of
our AI applications, but did require significant engineering,
testing, and safety certification effort.
Crew Autonomy demonstrations were not only designed
Figure 5: Astronauts using AMO TOCA SSC application
on iPad, September 2014.
to show that our AI algorithms can solve computationally
challenging problems; they were designed to provide deci-
sion support to astronauts. The user interfaces for each of
these demonstrations were designed in conjunction with user
studies conducted by human factors engineers; see (Frank
et al. 2017), (Aaseng et al. 2015) for some of the results
of these user interface evaluations. The on-orbit demonstra-
tions also provided data evaluated by human factors engi-
neers. Each lesson learned provides guidance and feedback
for the design of these decision support tools. Sometimes,
the lessons learned were surprising. For instance, crews put
a lot of trust into the software recommendations, and were
likely to follow the software’s recommendations. A limi-
tation with automation software is that it is only as good
as the knowledge coded within it, and this knowledge is
initially based upon pre-flight characterization of hardware
performance; mistakes in the software will lead the user
astray. Each demonstration provides insight into which fea-
tures are used, and which are not. Simplifying an application
may imply exposing information on demand only, a lesson
learned from repeated ISS rack powerup and configuration
demonstrations. In other cases, an AI technology was not
deemed useful; anomaly detection performed for TOCA did
not prompt direct action for the crew, and was generally dis-
regarded, so it has not been used in further demonstrations.
Vehicle Systems Management autonomy technology is in-
tegrated with flight software, which in turn interfaces di-
rectly with vehicle hardware. The core Flight System (cFS)
is a platform and project independent reusable software
framework and set of reusable software applications (Mc-
Comas, Wilmot, and Cudmore 2016). There are three key
aspects to the cFS architecture: a dynamic run-time envi-
ronment, layered software, and a component based design.
Autonomy applications are treated as new components and
integrated with cFS via existing messages; component inter-
action is handled via defining new messages between com-
ponents. CFS components are integrated via a message bus;
components can publish or subscribe to the message bus.
Hardware systems data (e.g. currents, pressure, temperature,
etc.) is published to the bus, and received by Fault Manage-
ment (ACAWS, HyDE, IMS/MMS). Fault management, in
turn, generates messages that are consumed by the executive
(PLEXIL) and planner (SCIP). PLEXIL issues commands
by publishing messages that are subscribed to by the hard-
ware. Integration challenges include orchestration of auton-
omy components via messages; extraction of the right in-
formation from hardware system messages; and, last but not
least, ensuring complex algorithms do not use too many re-
sources (CPU or memory) on embedded processors.
6 Related Work
NASA has previously invested in AI technologies for use
in Mission Control (Smith et al. 2014). Many of the tech-
nologies developed for use in Mission Control laid the tech-
nological foundation for the autonomy work described in
this paper. Methods to mitigate the impacts of time delay on
mission operations are evaluated in (Rader et al. 2013). An
investigation into crew autonomy focused on how to write
procedures for astronauts to follow that reduce the need for
assistance from Mission Control (Beisert et al. 2013). This
investigation did not use special technology to assist astro-
nauts in following procedures, but focused instead on writ-
ing guidelines, formatting, and information content. NASA
conducted a series of crew self-scheduling demonstrations
(Marquez et al. 2017) using Web-based technology to allow
astronauts to build a daily activity plan and then perform
the activities in this plan. Timeliner has been extensively
used to automate payload operations, and some additional
activities, onboard ISS (Cornelius and Frank 2016). Science-
driven extra-vehicular activity (EVA) was extensively stud-
ied during the recently completed BASALT project; a dis-
cussion of EVA operations planning and execution tools is
provided in (Beaton et al. 2019). Finally, the Astrobee free-
flying robot onboard ISS is capable of path and motion plan-
ning, image recognition, and hazard avoidance, all of which
are well-studied problems in AI (Bualat et al. 2018).
7 Summary
NASA’s future exploration missions will require smart ve-
hicles, smart robots, and decision support to aid astronauts.
NASA is investing in AI technology, both internally devel-
oped and commercial, to make this vision a reality. Auto-
mated planning, plan execution, and fault management tech-
nology using both automated reasoning and machine learn-
ing, have all been developed and demonstrated in a variety
of operational demonstrations, both onboard the ISS and in
analog environments. Figure 6 shows the range of AI and
associated technologies used in each of ASO’s projects (ex-
cept for (Frank et al. 2013)), as well as quantitative infor-
mation indicating the rough complexity of the problem to
be solved. These early investments will ensure the even-
tual AI solutions are robust and resilient to changes in en-
vironment, faults and failures, and also the somewhat un-
predictable nature of human-machine collaboration. Lessons
learned on systems engineering and integration, both ’down’
to the flight software, and ’up’ to the crew, will help design
the proper interactions both between AI components, and
between the AI components and the vehicle and its crew.
With further maturation of these AI technologies, NASA
will be ready to conduct its planned future human explo-
ration missions.
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